Xuhang Fan (Shawn)

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Self-Serving Interpretations of Ambiguity in Other-Regarding Behavior

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Haisley, Emily C., 和Roberto A. Weber. 《Self-Serving Interpretations of Ambiguity in Other-Regarding Behavior》. Games and Economic Behavior 68, 期 2 (2010年3月1日): 614–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.002.

摘要 ​

We demonstrate that people can adopt a favorable view of ambiguous risks relative to ones with known probabilities, contrary to the usual attitude of ambiguity aversion, when doing so permits justification for unfair behavior. We use binary dictator games involving a choice between a relatively equitable allocation and an “unfair” allocation that is both less generous and makes the recipient’s payment dependent on a p = 0.5lottery. Dictators choose the unfair option more frequently when the recipient’s allocation depends on an ambiguous lottery than on a lottery with a known probability — even though the objective distributions of outcomes are identical under the two kinds of lotteries. Dictators’ estimates of the expected value of the recipients’ allocations are inflated under ambiguity, indicating that dictators form self-serving beliefs about ambiguity. Finally, increased unfair behavior under ambiguity is extinguished when dictators are constrained by their own initial unmotivated, and negative, attitudes towards ambiguity.

人们可以利用模糊性来生成自利的信念，和以往的模糊性厌恶不同

二元独裁者实验

当模糊性厌恶先被激发的时候抑制了后来的自利辩解的行为

Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior ​

人们在自我利益和关心他人之间权衡；人们有模糊性厌恶 ​

人们经常牺牲个人收益为他人的福祉(Kahneman et al., 1986; Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Andreoni and Miller, 2002)

独裁者实验中的公平行为(Forsythe et al., 1994; see also Camerer, 2003)

将这种社会关注作为对公平或亲社会结果的偏好进行建模(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Benabou and Tirole, 2006)

人们在彩票上具有模糊性厌恶（10-10不如20-20，哪怕概率相同）(Curley and Yates, 1989; see also Sarin and Weber, 1993; Ho et al., 2002; Hsu et al., 2005)

模糊厌恶是对预期效用理论的挑战(Camerer and Weber, 1992)

建模（模糊下同样理性预期收益的赌博的价值低于更精确的赌博)(Smith, 1969; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Sarin and Wakker, 1998; Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002).

重要性的三个原因 ​

  1. 人们会为了他人的收益选择分配收益在DG中

    被试找到一个借口来不表现得亲社会同时用有偏信念为自己保持形象

    当人们有机会在不形成消极自我认知的情况下自私地行事时，公平或亲社会的行为就会减少(Rabin, 1995; Konow, 2000; Murnigham et al., 2001; Dana et al., 2006)

  2. 在某些情况下，基于个人想要相信的，对模糊性的态度是可塑的。

    个人处理信息的倾向和得出结论的方式与他们的动机相关(see Kunda, 1990 for a review of “motivated reasoning”).

    Bargaining and allocation decisions 的自利偏差(Messick and Sentis, 1979; Babcock et al., 1995, 1996; Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996; Diekmann et al., 1997; Konow, 2000.)

  3. 论证社会科学中"规律性"（）的相互作用如何扭转根本现象

    e.g. 本来模糊厌恶和其他研究可以预测实验中的经理不太可能在模糊性下解雇员工。

模糊性的生成方法 ​

盒子里面一共有20个chip,知道有red chip&blue chip，但是具体的chip个数未知

(e.g., Yates and Zukowski, 1976; Sarin and Weber, 1993;Fox and Tversky, 1995; Charness and Gneezy, 2003; Rustichini et al., 2005

人对模糊性的感知必须在比较中 ​

Fox and Tversky, 1995

因此哪怕between设计也必须uncertain和ambiguity都说明

理论框架和假设 ​

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled.png

决策和收益 ​

效用函数 ​

选择框架的约束条件 ​

A的最大化决策 ​

Proposition. Consider 2 individuals and ，with identical preference ,then and only if

这个很好理解，同样偏好的被试如果一个人自利一个人诚实那么一定是诚实的人对于彩票结果的估计更高

Hypothesis. 当对另一方的后果涉及模糊性而不是简单的风险时，参与者的行为将更加自私自利，信念将反应对于彩票更高的主观预期 但是这些关系不会发生在进行假想决策之后或者受先前态度约束之后

实验设计 ​

选择和估计 ​

每个人要做四轮选择（前面有一轮无激励的假想决策）

每个人都要测量主观信念

接受者应该是随机分配产生的

人人都先扮演独裁者(Hypothetical) ​

被试行为可能确实会由于随机分配的不利角色而行为不同。然而实验重点是被试行为是否在模糊性和简单风险之间改变，我们没有理由相信这些其他动机会与模糊性相互作用。

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彩票(Uncertainty/Ambiguity的实验实现) ​

Uncertain Lottery 袋子里装着各10的红片和蓝片，彩票由抽样决定

Ambiguity Lottery 袋子里装着数量不详的红片和蓝片，共计20只。彩票由抽样决定

Unconstrained Treatment ​

89 pairs of A and B participants (43 under simple risk, 46 under ambiguity)

每人假想决策。接着随机分配角色完成4个选择。被试的选择顺序不同，分成AB卷。

接着所有人都收到新表测量他们认为接受者会接受到的钱

最后他们完成盒子的抽样来决定彩票

实验最后做出一个选择来看他们关于风险和模糊的偏好→为了激发被试对于模糊性的厌恶（这里是为了控制收益和下面相等）

Constrained Treatment ​

58 pairs (29 under simple risk, 29 under ambiguity).

被试先完成一轮决策，有风险和模糊性，但没有自利和公平的冲突

被试完成的决策要么是uncertain要么是ambiguity，这是为了作为控制变量来确保被试不是自然的模糊厌恶。

接着做出一个选择来看他们关于风险和模糊的偏好→为了激发被试对于模糊性的厌恶

每人先做假想决策。接着随机分配角色完成4个选择。被试被提供的选择顺序是不同的，分成AB卷。

接着所有人都收到新表测量他们认为接受者会接受到的钱

最后他们完成盒子的抽样来决定彩票

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-2.png

实验结果 ​

衡量指标 ​

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-3.png

Choices ​

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-4.png

自利选项的比例：Unconstrained-Real——Ambiguity为 73% ，全场最高；Unconstrained-Real ——Simple Risk

其他实验局的Ambiguity——Simple Risk都没有差异→表明假设成立： 一旦被试先前表示自己倾向于simple rosk而不是Ambiguity，那么后面他们很难再对Ambiguity表示喜爱

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-5.png

Probit Regressions：支持

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-6.png

Real-Unconstrained 实验局中simple risk和Ambiguity情况下采取自利选择的比例

更多的参与者在简单风险下选择自私自利的0或1次 （33%）比在模糊性下 （11%）， 而更多的人选择利己3或4次模糊 （70%）相比simple risk（49%）

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-7.png

Estimate bias ​

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-8.png

Real-Unconstrained实验局下被试预估接受者收益为0.89

为什么光模糊性厌恶被激发的时候被试就会在simple risk和amboguity之间有同样对于被试信念的预期呢？真奇怪。

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-9.png

Additional analysis ​

Second Regression：自利行为和Estimate Bia同样正相关

Self-serving%20interpretations%20of%20ambiguity%20in%20other%205a7e065ba3f04735854c342fbf7e546e/Untitled-10.png

Conclusion ​

当人们被自利动机驱使的时候能够形成对于模糊性自利且积极的态度。人们对于模糊性的厌恶逆转了。

当人们形成自利信念的能力被限制的时候人们的自利行为被限制。